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Abstract. An important problem in the public sector, given the lack of
output prices and exit decisions to sanction inefficient units, is finding the
optimal industry structure. We apply a novel approach to Italian courts of
justice, a typical example of a small sector in the public domain but with
important effects on economic agents’ behavior, firm size, FDI, and on the
overall economy. The suggested approach enables us to break down the ag-
gregate court inefficiency into different sources and to investigate the optimal
structure of the justice sector. Results show that technical inefficiency (lack
of best practice) accounts for more than one third (38%) of total inefficiency,
while size inefficiency (courts that are too big) is about 22-25%. The remain-
ing inefficiency is represented by a sub-optimal allocation of inputs (30-40%).
If reallocation is confined to macroregional or regional borders, then techni-
cal and size inefficiencies increase in relative terms compared to reallocation
inefficiency. We suggest that, together with reallocating inputs by merging
smaller courts, a complementary set of policy interventions would be to adopt
best practices and split larger courts.
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1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis and the ensuing sovereign debt crisis have produced
a growing awareness of the need for structural reforms in order to increase
the public service efficiency and sustain higher economic prosperity. One of
these reforms concerns the structure of the judicial system and its effects
on the enforcement of contracts. With reduced public funds available, an
underfunded and unreformed court system could weaken the economy and
the access to justice (Economist, 2011). Some radical proposals in the UK
suggest that courts might even be privatized (Gibb and Ford, 2013).
Although small when compared to the whole economy, the judicial sys-
tem and the rule of law have a very significant impact on economic behav-
ior, investment choices and economic development (Aldashev, 2009). Eco-
nomic agents (households and firms) might exploit delays in justice delivery
to strategically postpone their contractual obligations to other parties. For
example, debtors might choose opportunistically to be sued by their creditors
hoping to obtain a substantial delay of the repayment deadline (see, e.g., Jap-
pelli et al., 2005). Court inefficiencies have also a detrimental impact on firm
size (Dougherty, 2013). Furthermore, the justice sector is a typical example
of a critical sector of the economy where the market system cannot work
properly given the absence of a functioning output price mechanism. Lack
of output price information means that it is difficult for agents to sanction
inefficient units.1
Therefore, it becomes particularly useful to envisage a method for measur-
ing inefficiency and potential optimal structures of the sector in order to set
effective policies aimed at improving its overall efficiency. In this paper, we
investigate the efficiency of Italian courts of justice, by proposing a new gen-
eral method for estimating the optimal structure of public sector industries.
The efficiency of the justice sector has received relatively limited attention in
the literature (Santos and Amado, 2014).2 More commonly we find partial
performance measures, such as trial length and the number of cases defined
per judge (see, e.g., CEPEJ, 2010). Efficiency analysis, however, allows per-
formance to be measured by taking into account all the resources used and
all the outcomes produced.
By international standards, the Italian judicial system is quite inefficient.
1In addition, in Italy, like in many other countries, cases are assigned to the local court
district and thus citizens cannot “choose with their feet”, that is decide to which court to
bring their case to.
2The reason for the paucity of papers investigating judicial system efficiency might be
that data at the court level are difficult to obtain. In this paper, we use a rich dataset
describing all the Italian courts of justice (165 observations) from 2003 to 2008.
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According to the World Bank’s Doing Business 2012, in terms of enforcing
contracts, Italy ranks 158th out of the 183 countries covered in the survey
(compare this, for example, to Germany (8th), Belgium (20th), UK (21st),
and Spain (54th)). In 2011, the average citizen had to wait about 900 days
to obtain a trial with judgment (World Bank, 2012). In addition, while in
Europe the average time for litigious civil and commercial cases was 282
days (median of 206), in Italy it was of 533 days (2008 data). In fact, of the
35 European countries considered in the survey, only Monaco, San Marino,
Bosnia & Herzegovina and Malta were less efficient than Italy (CEPEJ, 2010).
The average length of a trial in Italy varies from region to region as well,
reflecting the traditional dual structure of the Italian economy: in the poorer
and less industrialized southern regions, the average length of trials is twice
as long as in the richer industrialized northern regions (Figure 1, top panel).
The strategic use of judicial system inefficiencies can also (partially) explain
the pattern of the demand for justice, which is higher (Figure 1, middle
panel) in those areas with larger trial duration times, even though economic
activity in those areas is considerably lower (Figure 1, bottom panel).
The detrimental impact of judicial inefficiencies on the Italian economy
has been estimated to cause a loss of about 1% of GDP (Draghi, 2011)3.
In addition, there is evidence that an inefficient judicial system may hin-
der firms’ growth, which might explain why the average size of Italian firms
is among the smallest in OECD countries (Alesina and Giavazzi, 2011; Gi-
acomelli and Menon, 2013). This is especially important considering that
over the past decade the Italian economy has lagged behind in terms of GDP
growth compared to almost all other countries. Because law enforcement is
one of the key factors that promotes a healthy economy, the reform of the
judicial system - aimed at reducing trial length - may play a pivotal role for
long-term growth of the Italian economy and hence for the sustainability of
its public debt (see, e.g., the EU Council recommendation of 12 July 2011).
Various Italian governments have proposed judicial sector reforms. Prob-
ably the boldest are the measures enacted in 2012 by the Monti government,
which established the merger of 31 small size courts (out of 165 at national
level) with geographically adjacent larger ones.4
In this paper, we propose a comprehensive method that identifies the
optimal structure of an industry and looks at potential efficiency gains thanks
to economies of size and reallocation (Peyrache, 2013). Courts may face
increasing returns to scale when they are small due to economies of judge
3Chemin (2009) investigates the positive impact of a judiciary reform in Pakistan
through its effects on entrepreneurship. Using a difference-in-difference approach, he finds
that a reform that cost 0.1% of GDP had a positive impact estimated at 0.5% of GDP.
4Legislative decree no. 155 of September 9th, 2012.
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specialization (specialized judges are more productive than non-specialized
ones); after a certain point, this positive effect of specialization is offset by
congestion and management costs that basically lead to coordination failures
and lower productivity. When courts are freely adjustable in size, they can
be split (if too big) or merged with other contiguous ones (if too small). This,
of course, implies a court level production technology which is non-additive
and operates under variable returns to scale. The economies of size argument
can easily be understood by thinking of a classical U-shaped average cost
function, with increasing returns which revert to decreasing returns after an
optimal point (along a specified output ray).
By contrast to “standard” efficiency analysis (e.g., Data Envelopment
Analysis, DEA) that estimates whether individual firms face increasing, con-
stant, or decreasing returns to scale, our methodology allows to extend the
analysis at the aggregate level and thus represents a useful tool when con-
sidering the industry as a whole. We define as size inefficiency all those
inefficiencies that result from courts operating on too large a scale which
would benefit from a break-up into a number of smaller units. Reallocation
inefficiencies are, on the contrary, all those inefficiencies that arise because
of a misallocation of inputs across courts (a leading example being a merger
operation). Therefore, gains in production (which is equivalent to a shorten-
ing of trial duration) can be obtained via three very different channels and
policies: i) technical inefficiency reduction via adoption of best practices; ii)
break-up of large courts which are operating on too big a scale; iii) real-
location of inputs across courts in order to exploit economies of scale and
scope. These three main channels will also generate different components
of inefficiency which can be added together as an overall measure of sector
inefficiency.
The new methodology that we propose employs directional distance func-
tion (DDF) (see Chambers et al., 1996) to measure inefficiency at court level.
DDF, a generalization of the more traditional radial distance functions (see
Grosskopf et al., 1995), requires information on quantities (inputs and out-
puts) without any reference to prices, and it can easily be computed by using
linear programming.
Like other DEA studies, our empirical model does not require price in-
formation and is therefore generally applicable to public sector efficiency
evaluation (for example health, education, public transport, etc.). It is easy
to implement via linear programming and it provides a comprehensive view
of the overall inefficiency of the industry in addition to best practice effi-
ciency. This last point is especially important when considering that the
evaluation of the optimal structure of public sector industries is very difficult
to estimate because of the absence of relevant output price information.
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Our empirical results indicate that for Italian courts of justice, about
two fifths of inefficiency is due to lack of best practice adoption (technical
inefficiency), while reallocation inefficiency represents an additional two fifths
of total inefficiency of the sector. In addition, one fifth of total inefficiency is
due to size inefficiency, implying that a significant reduction in trial length
could be effectively achieved by splitting the largest courts in the sample.
However, if reallocation of inputs is limited to regional (or macroregional)
level, reallocation inefficiency reduces its importance and size.
We also find that while technical inefficiency follows traditional Italian
economic dualism, the size of the inefficiency component is homogeneously
distributed. This homogeneous distribution is probably due to the presence
of an administrative rule which establishes the presence of a fixed number of
courts per district,5 thus not allowing economies of scale to be appropriately
exploited (for example, big cities have only one court, while they should have
many more).
This evidence also suggests that a policy aimed at adopting best practices
and exploiting size economies by means of break-ups would complement re-
cent reforms and would be important contributing factors for improving over-
all sector efficiency. The Monti government’s last intervention, which aimed
to reduce public spending, establishes that some of the smaller courts should
be merged into adjacent larger ones. While probably effective in reducing
fixed production costs, this policy is not necessarily the only appropriate
one if we approach the problem from an efficiency perspective. Indeed, best
practice adoption and size reduction for the bigger courts may be effective
complementary policy options. In addition, given that many of the courts to
be closed will merge with larger ones, the risk is that these recently imple-
mented merging operations might worsen size inefficiency, reducing or even
canceling-out potential positive effects of mergers, and thus increasing the
adverse effects on long-run economic development of an inefficient justice
sector.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the literature,
highlighting similarities and differences of our paper compared to existing
contributions. In section 3, we explain our methodology,6 by extending the
results presented in Peyrache (2013) to the case where reallocation of in-
puts happens at different aggregation levels (national, macro-regional, or
5The territorial distribution of Italian courts mostly resembles the one designed after
the country unification, in 1865, which was based on the ones prevailing with the previous
states (Giacomelli and Menon, 2013).
6Among other studies that consider an overall measure of industry efficiency, the inter-
ested reader may consider Aparicio et al. (2013), Asmild et al. (2009; 2012), Fang (2013),
Lotfi et al. (2010), Peyrache (2015), Ray et al. (2008), Yu and Lin (2008), Yu et al. (2013).
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regional). We describe the dataset in section 4, while section 5 discusses
our main empirical results. Section 6 is a brief discussion of the main policy
implications of this research. Finally, we offer our conclusions in section 7.
2 Literature review
There are not many papers dealing with the efficiency of courts of justice.
Lewin et al. (1982) is probably the first study on this topic, dealing with
the North-Carolina criminal superior courts for 1976 and using the so-called
CCR input oriented measure developed by Charnes et al. (1978). Their study
considers two outputs - the number of defined cases and the number of cases
pending less than 90 days - and five inputs, among which the stock of cases
pending at the end of the year.
Kittelsen and Forsund (1992) investigate the technical efficiency (with
both input- and output-oriented CCR and the BCC measure developed by
Banker et al., 1984) and calculate a Malmquist index of productivity to
analyze Norwegian courts from 1983 to 1988. While they consider only two
inputs - judges and staff - they consider seven categories of cases as different
outputs thus taking into account the heterogeneity of different cases in terms
of complexity and time taken.
Tulkens (1993) uses the Free Disposable Hull (FDH) to investigate Belgian
justice of peace courts for the period 1983-1985. Since each court has one
judge, he considers only one input, i.e., staff, and three outputs: number of
defined cases in civil and commercial matters, number of sessions held for
family matters, and number of defined cases for minor offenses.
Pedraja-Chaparro and Salinas-Jimenez (1996) estimate input-oriented
CCR and BCC measures of Spanish courts in 1991. As with Kittelsen and
Forsund (1992), they consider only two inputs (judges and staff), but also
only two case categories, i.e., number of cases defined with a sentence and the
number of cases defined without a sentence, without taking into account case
heterogeneity. Along these lines, Yeung and Azevedo (2011), using the num-
ber of judges and staff on the input side, and the number of defined cases
in first and second-degree courts, investigate the efficiency of 27 Brazilian
State courts. Ferrandino (2012) estimates the efficiency of Florida’s circuit
courts for the period 1993-2008; by considering the number of judges per
circuit as the only input, as output he uses the number of defined cases
for all circuits, i.e., criminal, civil, and family courts, thus exacerbating the
aggregation problem.7
7Schneider (2005) investigates the links between career incentives for judges and courts
performances measured with DEA.
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Deyneli (2012) performs a comparative analysis of the court systems of
22 European countries (each analyzed at national level) using a two-stage
DEA for 2006. In the first stage, he performs DEA using judges and staff
as inputs and three outputs: defined civil cases, defined criminal cases, and
population. In the second stage, using a Tobit regression he looks at the
influence of judges’ salaries on efficiency scores.
A recent study that deals specially with the heterogeneity across cases is
Santos and Amado (2014). Consistently with some of the previous studies,
they consider two inputs - judges and support staff - but they exploit a rich
set of data on the output side, considering 43 different typologies of cases
aggregated by type of proceedings. To the best of our knowledge, this study
has one of the richest output specifications in DEA literature. They reduce
the curse of dimensionality, i.e., low discrimination in results, by imposing
weight restrictions based on production trade-offs proxied by the average
duration in all courts for a particular type of proceeding. They investigate
the efficiency of Portuguese courts from 2007 to 2011, finding significant
technical inefficiency and also scale inefficiency in smaller courts.
To the best of our knowledge, among studies investigating the Italian
judicial system, Marchesi is the author who started first and worked more
extensively to analyze Italian courts. For instance, Marchesi (2003; 2008)
estimates a translog input requirement function - mainly because she has
only information on judges on the input side - with data from Italian courts
for 1996, 2001, and 2006 (167 courts each year). For outputs, she considers
defined criminal cases, defined labor cases, civil cases defined with a sentence
and civil cases defined without a sentence, plus the total stock of pending
cases. She finds that, overall, courts operate in the increasing returns to
scale region of technology, and she finds that about 70-80% of courts are too
small. She therefore suggests revising the court structure by merging smaller
courts to exploit economies of specialization.8
Finocchiaro Castro and Guccio (2014) look at district courts in 2006 by
using a two-stage DEA. In the first stage, they perform DEA (a smoothed
bootstrapped procedure to get unbiased estimates) using three inputs - judges,
staff and pending cases - and two outputs, i.e., civil and other defined cases.
In the second stage, with a semi-parametric technique a` la Simar and Wilson
(2007), they show that efficiency is explained by demand factors, thus sup-
porting the view that the opportunistic behavior of claimants and lawyers
has a negative impact on the courts’ operations.
8Marselli and Vannini (2004), with input oriented CCR and BCC measures, investigate
the 29 Appeal Court Districts in 2002. Among the inputs, they consider judges, incoming
(civil and criminal) and pending cases (both civil and criminal), while among the outputs
they consider defined cases, both civil and criminal ones.
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Falavigna et al. (2015) uses DEA with a directional distance function
approach to investigate the technical efficiency of 103 tax courts in the period
2009-2011. As output, they use defined cases; in addition, they consider the
time needed to define a case as a bad output, and thus an output to be
reduced. As inputs, they consider the number of judges and the demand for
justice, i.e., incoming and pending cases. In a second stage, they investigate
the effects of exogenous variables on technical efficiency.
All these studies estimate court efficiency using DEA, but they also share
another common trait: they look at individual DMUs and not at inefficiencies
at industry level. To appreciate the difference, suppose you have an industry
with 100 courts, each with 10 judges, and 10 courts with 100 judges each, for
a total of 110 courts and 2,000 judges. Marchesi (2003), for instance, finds
that the optimal size is 20 judges. With a “standard” DEA approach, you
would find that all small courts show increasing returns to scale, while only
10 courts show decreasing returns to scale. Therefore you would conclude
that, as Marchesi does, the major problem in the industry is that courts are
too small, given that 100 out of 110 courts share the same problem.
However, the approach we present next adds two new elements to this
analysis. First, it considers explicitly what the overall effect is (at industry
level) of the different sources of inefficiency. So, in this simplified example, we
can easily ascertain whether we could have greater improvements in overall
efficiency by merging the 100 small courts, or by splitting the 10 big ones, or
both. In our application, the surprising result - at least compared to much
of the analysis of Marchesi (2008) - is that by splitting the few major courts
we would have a very significant increase in industry efficiency. Second, we
can “tailor” this analysis at national (i.e., NUTS 0), macroregional (NUTS
1) or regional (NUTS 2) levels, thus taking into account, for instance, con-
straints in factor mobility. This latter differentiated level of (dis)aggregation
represents a substantial move forward compared to the study of Peyrache
(2013).
3 Methodology
Consider an industry (or sector) of K ∈ R++ firms where x ∈ RN+ inputs
produce y ∈ RM+ outputs. Observations for a panel data are collected into
two matrices: the input matrix Xt =
[
xt1 ... x
t
K
]
of dimension K×N for
each time period and the output matrix Yt =
[
yt1 ... y
t
K
]
of dimension
K ×M for each time period. The collection of these matrices:(
Xt,Yt
)
, t = 1, ..., T, (1)
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can represent the dataset. We also assume that firms can be clustered into
groups according to an aggregation rule. This rule can be expressed using a
matrix A of dimension K × L where L is the number of aggregation levels
and the entries of the matrix are group indexes. This matrix assigns each
firm in the dataset to a specific group gl at each level of aggregation l. So,
for example, if we consider regions, macro-regions and country, there will be
3 levels of aggregation (L = 3) and at each level of aggregation each firm will
belong to a specific sub-group. Thus for each level of aggregation l = 1, . . . , L
there will be a number of groups gl = 1, ..., Gl. Here we assume that the level
of aggregation index l is ordered with the highest level of aggregation being
1 and lowest level being L.
We define the firm production possibilities set (or production set, or
technology) as the variable returns to scale data envelopment (DEA) of the
set of observations at time t:
Ψt =
{
(x,y) : λXt ≤ x, λYt ≥ yt,
∑
λk = 1, λ ≥ 0
}
. (2)
For each level of aggregation the industry production technology (as op-
posed to the firm production technology) is defined as:
ΨtI =
{
(x,y) : λXt ≤ x, λYt ≥ yt,
∑
λk = S, λ ≥ 0
}
. (3)
The firm directional distance function (DDF) represents, in a functional
way, the firm technology (Chambers et al., 1996) and is given by:
Dt (x,y,gx,gy) = supβ
{
β : (x− gxβ,y + gyβ) ∈ Ψt
}
. (4)
The DDF is searching for the maximum expansion of outputs and contrac-
tion of inputs along the direction (gx,gy), which is feasible with technology
(2). For this reason, the DDF can be interpreted as an absolute measure of
technical inefficiency, representing the firm’s physical outputs lost and inputs
wasted, measured in terms of a fixed numeraire.
The DDF can also be used to give a functional representation of the
industry technology (3):
DtI(x,y,gx,gy) = supβ
{
β : (x− gxβ,y + gyβ) ∈ ΨtI
}
. (5)
While the firm DDF (4) is a standard linear program, the industry DDF
(5) calls for a mixed integer linear program to be solved. The optimal solution
will return the value of the DDF and an integer value for the intensity vector
constraint. The optimal value of the intensity vector is interpreted as the
optimal number of firms that should populate the industry if production has
to be delivered efficiently.
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3.1 Industry group efficiency
The firm DDF (4) can be computed for each firm in group gl of aggregation
level l and can be summed up (due to the fact that it is an additive notion)
into an index of group technical efficiency for the aggregation level l:
ITEtgl =
∑
k∈gl
Dt
(
xtk,y
t
k,gx,gy
)
. (6)
This indicator is a measure of input waste and output loss at the industry
level due to the technical inefficiencies of the firms actually operating in the
industry. We now define the total observed inputs and outputs at time t for
the aggregation group gl as: I
t
gl
=
∑
k∈gl x
t
k, Q
t
gl
=
∑
k∈gl y
t
k. The following
mixed integer linear program indicates a measure of industry efficiency for
the aggregation group gl:
IEtgl = D
t
I
(
Itgl ,Q
t
gl
,gx,gy
)
. (7)
Here, we should note that even if all the firms in the industry are techni-
cally efficient (i.e., ITE=0), the industry could still be inefficiently organized
(i.e., IEt > 0). The discrepancy between the two indicators is a measure of
organizational inefficiency of the industry. This indicator cannot be smaller
than zero (ITEt ≤ IEt) and represents the inefficiency arising from the
way the industry is structured. Two main effects make up this indicator:
firstly, inefficiencies arising from firms that are operating on too large a scale
and could be conveniently split into smaller firms; secondly, re-allocation of
factors across firms.
3.2 Size Inefficiency and break-ups
Size inefficiency is defined as:
SEt
(
xtk,y
t
k,gx,gy
)
= DtI
(
xtk,y
t
k,gx,gy
)−Dt (xtk,ytk,gx,gy) . (8)
The firm is said to be size inefficient if SEt (xtk,y
t
k,gx,gy) > 0. If a firm is
size inefficient, it can be split into a number of smaller units inducing a gain
in production efficiency. Size inefficiencies of individual firms can be added
up to obtain an indicator of size inefficiency at industry level:
ISEtgl =
∑
k∈gl
SEt
(
xtk,y
t
k,gx,gy
)
. (9)
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This last indicator represents the gain in production that could be ob-
tained if all the large firms were split into an optimal number of smaller
units. In Figure 2(b) we give an example of size efficiency. Firm B is size
efficient: no gain in production can be obtained by splitting it into separate
firms. Note that firm B is operating in a decreasing returns to scale regime,
therefore decreasing returns are not sufficient for size inefficiency to arise.
On the other hand, firm C is size inefficient, since by splitting it into two
separate firms it is possible to gain SE = y′C − yC in production at industry
level. Analogously, by splitting firm D into three separate firms it is possible
to increase industry production by SE = y′D − yD.
3.3 Structural decomposition of industry inefficiency
The reallocation indicator is defined as the deviation between the industry
organizational indicator and the indicators defined in the previous two sec-
tions: IREtgl = IE
t
gl
− ITE − ISEtgl . With all those components in place,
the industry inefficiency indicator (7) can be conveniently decomposed in the
following way for group gl at the level of aggregation l:
IEtgl = ITE
t
gl
+ ISEtgl + IRE
t
gl
. (10)
The left-hand side reflects a measure of output loss and input waste at
the given level of aggregation. The right-hand side splits this inefficiency
into different components: inefficiency arising from technical inefficiency of
individual firms (ITE), inefficiencies arising from individual firm size ineffi-
ciencies (ISE), and potential gains from re-allocation of inputs across firms
(IRE).
Equation (10) measures inefficiency as an absolute number (e.g., the total
number of additional cases that could be potentially defined each year). It
allows for comparing performance in absolute terms but poses some prob-
lems if one is interested in a relative measure of inefficiency. To overcome
this problem, we computed an indicator that allows for a straightforward
comparison in relative terms (i.e., a number between zero and one):
%ITEt + %ISEt + %IREt = 1, (11)
where %ITEt = ITE
t
IEt
, %ISEt = ISE
t
IEt
and %IREt = IRE
t
IEt
.
3.4 Reallocation at different levels of aggregation
We note that the previous decomposition can be made more interesting by
looking at reallocation effects across levels of aggregation. In fact, IREtgl
11
represents the potential efficiency gain obtainable via a reallocation of inputs
across production units within group gl at level of aggregation l. This means
that the overall efficiency gains obtainable at level of aggregation l is the sum
of all these reallocation effects:
IREtl =
Gl∑
gl=1
IREtgl .
This indicator is a measure of output loss when we restrict reallocation of
inputs to only within each group at the level of aggregation l. We note that
going from a lower to a higher level of aggregation the reallocation effect
will increase, i.e., IREtl ≥ IREtl+1. The difference between the reallocation
components between level l and level l + 1 is:
∆IREtl = IRE
t
l − IREtl+1.
At the highest level of aggregation l = 1 there will only be 1 group. The
overall inefficiency of the system can be attributed to a technical efficiency
effect, a size efficiency effect and reallocation effects across the different levels
of aggregation:
IEt = ITEt + ISEt + ∆IREt1 + . . .+ ∆IRE
t
L−1 + IRE
t
L.
Since there is only one group at the highest level of aggregation, the
technical and size efficiency components can be obtained by summing up
all the firm level indicators for the whole sample. The reallocation effect is
now decomposed: IREtL is the reallocation inefficiency at the lowest level of
aggregation; ∆IREtL−1, . . . ,∆IRE
t
1 are the additional reallocation inefficien-
cies when moving from one level of aggregation to the next. This will be our
decomposition of the overall inefficiency of the system.
4 Input and Output Specifications and Data
The measures we have available for inputs and outputs are as follows: for
the outputs, we consider the number of cases that were defined, i.e., resolved
by courts, in a particular year, distinguishing between civil and criminal
cases. The civil cases are further broken down into labor, social security,
and remaining civil cases, for a total of four outputs. As regards inputs,
we consider the number of judges (distinguishing between professional and
non-professional judges) and the number of staff who are not judges (mainly
administrative staff).
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We also consider the number of pending cases, i.e., the caseload, at the
beginning of the year (distinguishing between civil and criminal cases) as
two additional inputs. This choice was first suggested by Lewin et al. (1982),
then used by other authors,9 and can be defended on common sense grounds:
without pending cases, there would be no defined cases and, therefore, no
output. In general, in any system, there is a percentage of pending cases, and
these cases can be interpreted as an intermediate input stock (raw material
inventory or working capital).
The use of pending cases as an additional input is somewhat controversial
in literature. One of the most important arguments put forward for consider-
ing caseload, is that courts cannot provide services unless lawsuits are filed.
As stated above, pending cases are then considered as a raw material or an
intermediate input in this case. Supporters of this view argue that if caseload
is omitted there is the risk that some courts are considered inefficient when
compared to others because they do not have enough cases to resolve (rather
than because they are not resolving their cases efficiently). This effect of
course vanishes if the caseload is high enough to meet the available resources
at court level.
Authors that advocate not using caseload as an input variable claim so
mainly for two reasons: firstly, that pending cases may reflect past perfor-
mance of the courts, and therefore there is the risk of double counting; sec-
ondly, even when a court does not have enough cases to process, one should
adjust the other resources to meet the demand, rather than deem the unit
as efficient. The first point is important when one is dealing with policy con-
siderations: to make a court efficient, one should also provide the additional
resources needed to get rid of the stock of pending cases, i.e., the backload.
On the other hand, when considering the efficiency of the court, we should
consider the backload as part of the measurement.
On the second point, note that it may be inefficient from an aggregate
perspective to reduce the size of a court just because demand is too low. One
might focus on ways of increasing the demand (therefore the caseload) for
small courts by, for example, reallocating cases from one court to another.
But others may argue that, to be close to the people they serve, smaller courts
might reallocate some of their capacity. Considering that the question is still
unresolved, and given our interest in results that are robust to alternative
specifications, we run the model with and without pending cases as additional
inputs. The main results of the paper stay unchanged.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for inputs and outputs available for
9Notably, Marchesi (2003; 2008), Marselli and Vannini (2004), Finocchiaro Castro and
Guccio (2014), Falavigna et al. (2015).
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the pooled sample of 165 courts over the period 2003-2008 (a total of 990
observations).10 Average size in terms of defined civil cases is almost double
that of criminal cases with an increase in the last part of the period under
consideration (2007 and 2008). The number of judges is stable over time
with a slight decline in 2008. Other staff decreased from an average of 100
employees in 2003 to about 96 in 2008. Lastly, pending civil cases decreased
slightly, while they stayed almost the same for criminal cases.
We set gx = 0 and employ an output DDF with gy = 1 in equations
(4) and (5): inefficiency measure associated with this numeraire represents
the total number of cases that could be additionally (potentially) defined in
a given year. This choice reflects two important features of our empirical
problem. Firstly, courts are given a limited quantity of input resources, and
they are required to use those resources efficiently. Secondly, our interest
focuses basically on reducing trial length in order to maximize the positive
effects on the economy, but reducing trial length can be achieved only by
increasing output production (and keeping the level of inputs fixed). These
two arguments justify our choice of the directional vector. 11
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Industry Efficiency and its Decomposition
Table 2 reports the aggregate results for each year and on average for the
whole period, when there are no constraints on reallocation at national level
(see top rows). To reiterate, industry inefficiency in absolute terms corre-
sponds to the number of cases that it would be possible to further process if
the industry were to be organized efficiently. Industry inefficiency is on aver-
age almost 800,000 cases per year in our sample. This number compares to
the actual number of cases defined and pending. Every year about 4 million
cases are defined and about 4.5 million are pending: if all inefficiencies were
eliminated, about 800,000 additional cases could be defined in each year. Al-
ternatively, the average waiting time for a case to be defined is above one
year (and in fact every year half a million pending cases will be added to
these figures); eliminating slightly more than half of the inefficiency from the
10For the court of Bolzano, data on other staff is not available. We therefore imputed
them using the impute command in Stata with the regression method and the number of
judges and other staff as exogenous variables.
11We performed some robustness checks by changing the directional vector. We found
that the empirical results (and their policy implications) remain the same. These results
are available upon request.
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system would put it on a steady-state where the number of pending cases
would not grow and the processing time would fall to under one year.
Industry inefficiency grows for most of the period; it reaches a peak in
2007 (almost one million cases) and then decreases to a minimum of about
600,000 cases in 2008.12 The other columns in Table 2 report the compo-
nents embedded in equation (10). Industry technical efficiency (ITE), which
represents the summ of the courts technical inefficiencies (lack of best prac-
tice adoption), represents, on average, 38% of industry inefficiency which
amounts to about 300,000 more cases per year that on average could be fur-
ther defined. In other words, more than one third of industry inefficiency
is due to deviations from best practice. ITE is higher at the beginning of
the period (with a peak of 42% in 2003), decreasing over time, but with an
increase in the last year under study, 2008.
Another source of industry inefficiency is size inefficiency (ISE). On av-
erage, this component accounts for about 22% of industry inefficiency, with
about 170,000 more potential cases that could be defined every year. The
trend over time is changing, but in almost all years ISE represents about one
fifth of industry inefficiency, and in 2007 it is almost as significant as ITE it-
self. Reallocation efficiency (IRE) is about 40% of industry inefficiency, with
over 300,000 cases that could be further defined every year by reallocating
inputs across courts. IRE is variable over time, but it never goes below about
one third of industry inefficiency.
However, IRE depends on possible constraints to inputs reallocation, i.e.,
that is on the aggregation level. Indeed, these values are the potential effi-
ciency gains one could obtain if inputs could be reallocated at national level.
In fact, some inputs, e.g., judges or administrative staff, may have limited
mobility due to regulations, presence of strong unions, etc. If mobility is
reduced, we can compute the reallocation inefficiencies referring to a reallo-
cation confined to the macroregional or regional level (see bottom rows of
Table 2). Moving inputs from a national to a regional level reduces reallo-
cation inefficiencies from an average of 40% to 30% of industry inefficiency,
while technical and size inefficiency both increase, respectively from 30% to
almost 45% and from 22% to 25%.13
12This pattern may be related to the Collective Clemency Bill passed in 2006 (for an
analysis of its effects see Drago et al., 2009).
13It is worth noting that when computing reallocation, in our Matlab algorithm we
impose geographical constraints (at national or more disaggregated levels) for all inputs.
Since some of these reallocation might be practically feasible only for some of the inputs,
we could extend our routines to consider only a subest of inputs that could be reallocated
(at the feasible geographical level). Thus, our IRE measure provides in fact an upper
bound of the possible gains from input reallocation.
15
To summarize, during the period under investigation and for the entire
Italian judicial system, industry inefficiency (IE) is quite high, almost 800,000
cases on average. The various components are technical efficiency (ITE),
accounting for about 38% of total inefficiency; reallocation efficiency (about
40%); and size efficiency (about 22%). However, when inputs reallocation
is confined to macroregions or regions, it decreases to about 30%, while
technical (45%) and size efficiencies (25%) grow in importance.
This decomposition of overall industry inefficiency highlights what source
- and possibly which economic policy - is most important for improving
court efficiency. While the Italian government has recently implemented the
merger of smaller courts, our results show that technical and size inefficiencies
account for about 60-70% of the industry inefficiency and should definitely be
the target of further policy interventions. Firstly, policy should push worse
performing courts to adopt best practices to increase the speed with which
justice is delivered. Secondly, large courts should be the target of break-up
policy operations to eliminate inefficiencies associated with size so as to move
courts back to the optimal operation point.
5.2 The Differences across Regions
In this section, we synthesize the results obtained so far. Firstly, by using the
results in percentage terms, we aim for an efficiency ranking of Italian regions.
Secondly, by using the inefficiencies expressed in absolute terms, we can focus
on the regions where inefficiency reduction would have the biggest impact in
terms of additional processing of cases and thus in terms of shortening the
length of trials nationwide.14
When considering overall industry inefficiency in relative terms, Valle
d’Aosta and Trentino A.-A. are the most efficient regions, followed by Marche
and Piemonte (Figure 3, left panels). The least efficient regions are in the
South and the Islands: Basilicata, Calabria, Sardegna and Sicilia are con-
stantly among the worst performers during the period.
By looking at the absolute values (Figure 3, right panels), however, it is
worth noticing that Sicilia is the region where the inefficiencies are over 10,000
potential cases per year for every year considered. Calabria, Campania,
Lazio, and Lombardia are other major sources of inefficiency, although with
fewer than 10,000 potential cases each. If we were to concentrate policy
interventions in selected areas, these regions would be the primary targets.
Let us now consider now the different sources of (in)efficiency, starting
14In the following figures, due to space limitations, we report only the results for even
years, i.e., 2004, 2006 and 2008. Other results are available from the authors.
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with Industry technical Efficiency (ITE, see Figure 4). Here, the most effi-
cient regions are in the North (for all years in the study), while the worst
performers are in the South. Indeed, adoption of best practices should be
mainly targeted at the regions in the South and Islands of Italy. But note
that although ITE is overall higher in the North, there are some efficient
courts in other regions as well. This is clearly visible when we consider effi-
ciency at court level (see Figure 5). However, the efficient courts are mostly
in the North, and their number increases over time. In other words, there
is a dualism between North and South in terms of court efficiency, and the
differences seem to be increasing over the period under consideration.
Given these results, it seems that major inefficiencies follow the tradi-
tional dual economy of the country. But this is not necessarily true if one
looks at size efficiency (Figure 6): although very strong in the South, size
inefficiencies are more homogeneously and pervasively distributed across the
country. In fact, even in the northern regions, size inefficiencies are the major
component of overall industry efficiency. For example, Milano (the economic
capital of the country, in the North) has pretty much the same size ineffi-
ciency as Palermo (in the South) and much higher than many cities in the
South. Therefore, size inefficient courts are geographically distributed quite
evenly across the country and they mostly coincide with those located in
the largest cities such as Genova, Milano, Bologna, Firenze, Roma, Napoli,
Catania and Cagliari. This is quite visible if we consider the distribution of
size inefficiency in absolute values (Figure 6, right panels).
This evidence points to the fact that size matters across the whole coun-
try, and it does not have a structural relationship with the dualism of the
Italian economy. In Figure 7, we consider the courts that should be split.
Taking 2008, the last year for which we have data available, it appears that
about a third of courts are too big and should undergo break-up operations.
We believe this is quite as a strong result, but probably it should not be
surprising: the actual court configuration is still the same as in 1865, when
Italy was unified, but when the population was about twenty-two million
(compared to about sixty million now).
In Table 3 we also consider how many smaller courts each large court
should be divided into.15 Roma, Milano, Palermo, Catania, and Napoli suffer
from the most severe size inefficiency. Milano, for instance, on average could
process over 16,000 additional cases every year, and in 2007 this number
exceeded 29,000 cases. This result suggests that a large part (about 2% of
industry and over 10% of size) of the national overall inefficiencies is just
due to size inefficiency of the huge court alone in the economic capital of the
15We only report those courts which should be split into more than three units.
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country.
6 Policy implications
In 2012, the Monti government (appointed to manage the economic and
political crisis in Italy) tried to implement a reform in order to meet the EU
country-specific policy recommendations aimed at “reducing the length of
contract law enforcement procedures” (Council of the European Union, 12
July 2011). However, the policy debate about this reform has been mainly
driven by a cost reduction strategy. Mergers were proposed as the preferred
tool to be used to close down the smaller courts and save on fixed costs
(associated with building maintenance). The main “scientific” justification
for these operations relied on the idea that such operations would have made
it possible to exploit economies of scale in the production of justice.
The problems associated with the Italian judicial system have quite a
long history, and there has thus been a long on-going policy debate on the
reforms needed in order to bring the system towards more efficiency. In
2008, for instance, the Ministry of Economy calculated the elasticity of scale
of Italian courts (2006 data) and found that about 85% of them were too
small (this evidence confirmed earlier results for the years 1996 and 2001; see
Marchesi (2003; 2008)). The associated policy recommendation was “. . . to
revise judiciary geography, by merging the smaller courts in order to real-
ize economies of scale and specialization . . . ” (Commissione Tecnica per la
Finanza Pubblica, 2008: 46).
The evidence we provide in this study however shows that the array of
policies needed to increase the efficiency of the judicial system is wider than
previously suggested. We find that reallocation operations would reduce the
inefficiency of the system by (at most) 40% of the overall observed ineffi-
ciency. If limited to regional level, this policy would reduce it at most by
30%. Moreover, of the 31 courts that should be closed, 12 will be merged
with courts that are already too big (see Table 4). All this means that the
suggested operations might in fact decrease size efficiency, with possibly only
a modest reduction in reallocation inefficiency.16
Therefore, while most of the literature on Italian courts efficiency has
highlighted increasing returns to scale and thus the need to increase court
size, in this research we emphasize that two other major contributors to
the inefficiency of the Italian judicial system are the lack of best practice
16In Table 4 we can see that the first proposal of reform, made public in July 2012, would
have had a less detrimental effect on size inefficiency, since most of the “incorporating”
courts were not too big. The second proposal of the government is in this sense pejorative.
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adoption (technical inefficiency) and courts operating on a too large a scale
(size inefficiency). The first source is geographically distributed, following the
traditional North-South divide of the Italian economy, with southern courts
finding it difficult to learn from best practices. The second contributor, on
the other hand, is homogeneously distributed all across the country and does
not reflect the typical economic dualism. These results suggest that the main
reason behind such a detrimental growth in the dimension of courts might
be due to an institutional constraint. In fact, the organizational structure
enacted after the unification of the country in 1865, with policies of the type
“one district-one court” type is still operational.
According to these findings, we may conclude that in addition to input
reallocation, the government should pursue two further important policies
to increase the efficiency of the judicial sector: first, best-practice adoption,
targeted at the South and Islands of the country; and second, break-ups of
large courts. In the long term, the system would converge on a trial duration
comparable with other European countries, promoting a fairer justice system
and higher economic growth.
7 Concluding remarks
The judicial system plays a pivotal role in the enforcement of contracts, the
definition of property rights and, thus, for the proper functioning of market
economies. In this paper, we estimate the efficiency of Italian courts of
justice, a textbook example of a very inefficient system, with excessive length
of trials that affects the lives of citizens, discourages foreign investments, and
ultimately hinders economic growth.
We employ a methodology that allows for decomposing industry (or to-
tal) inefficiency into technical inefficiency, size inefficiency and reallocation
inefficiency. This methodology is particularly useful for services or sectors
in the public domain where, given the absence of a functioning price mech-
anism, market competition cannot sanction inefficient units. Our analysis
allows for identfying the units - be they jurisdictions, regions, areas, etc. -
and targeting them with policies aimed at reducing technical, size, or re-
allocation inefficiency. In other words, it becomes possible to set priorities
by anticipating their impact on (in)efficiency and focusing these policies on
different geographical areas.
In the case of Italian courts of justice, we find that the main source of
inefficiency is technical: by adopting best practices, courts could increase
the number of defined cases (on average) by 38 to 45%. We also find a
geographical dualism in the distribution of these inefficiencies, with efficient
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courts in the North and Centre and inefficient ones in the South and Islands.
Another source of inefficiency, accounting for one third of total inefficiency, is
reallocation inefficiency. Lastly, up to one quarter of total inefficiency is due
to the excessive size of the courts located in larger cities. We show that this
last source of inefficiency is homogeneously distributed across the country
and is concentrated in the largest cities.
Recently, the Italian government has implemented policies to reduce the
number of courts by implementing merger operations (thus hoping to save
on fixed costs). As we argue in the paper, the effect of these operations on
overall industry inefficiency might be negligible or might even be pejorative.
The risk is, in fact, that the overall inefficiency of the system will increase,
to the extent that some of the smaller courts are merged with some courts
that are already too big. Following our investigation, we thus propose a com-
plementary set of policies: adopting best practices in technically inefficient
courts, especially in the South, and breaking-up the few larger ones.
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Table 1: Inputs and outputs (990 obs.)
Variables 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
(St.dev.) (St.dev.) (St.dev.) (St.dev.) (St.dev.) (St.dev.)
Outputs
Defined cases, civil 12,668 13,088 12,946 12,893 13,448 14,223
(19,564) (20,412) (19,642) (19,378) (19,960) (21,066)
Defined cases, labor 978 1,003 1,028 942 1,021 913
(2,552) (2,453) (2,479) (2,347) (2,349) (2,067)
Defined cases, social security 1,862 1,709 1,835 1,591 1,770 1,714
(4,448) (3,795) (4,247) (3,871) (4,211) (4,167)
Defined cases, criminal 7,538 7,599 7,265 6,822 7,083 7,324
(10,069) (10,095) (9,461) (8,572) (8,481) (9,083)
Inputs
Professional judges 28 28 28 28 28 27
(45) (45) (45) (45) (45) (44)
Non professional judges 12 12 12 12 12 11
(17) (17) (16) (16) (17) (16)
Other staff 100 99 97 96 93 96
(141) (139) (136) (133) (129) (131)
Pending cases, civil 21,775 21,257 20,998 21,014 21,231 21,106
(33,761) (32,527) (32,001) (31,883) (31,817) (31,990)
Pending cases, criminal 6,697 6,568 6,648 6,640 6,809 6,782
(11,498) (11,860) (11,523) (10,710) (10,205) (10,120)
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Table 2: Industry Efficiency and its decomposition
Year Industry Size Technical Reallocation
Efficiency Efficiency Efficiency Efficiency
National level (NUTS 0)
2003 693,115 116,543 294,254 282,318
(100%) (16.8%) (42.5%) (40.7%)
2004 752,692 151,837 306,869 293,987
(100%) (20.2%) (40.8%) (39.1%)
2005 970,648 206,147 353,247 411,255
(100%) (21.2%) ( 36.4%) (42.4%)
2006 700,478 150,920 272,357 277,201
(100%) (21.5%) (38.9%) (39.6%)
2007 995,854 267,808 295,503 432,542
(100%) (26.9%) (29.7%) (43.4%)
2008 601,643 120,357 288,150 193,137
(100%) (20.0%) (47.9%) (32.1%)
2003-2008 785,739 168,935 301,730 315,074
(100%) (21.5%) (38.4%) (40.1%)
Macroregional level (NUTS 1)
2003-2008 739,131 168,935 301,730 268,466
(100%) (22.9%) (40.8%) (36.3%)
Regional level (NUTS 2)
2003-2008 677,185 168,935 301,730 206,520
(100%) (24.9%) (44.6%) (30.5%)
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Table 3: Courts that Should be Split
Courts Area Region 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Genova N.-W. Liguria – – 9,825 8,200 8,726 4,788
(-) (-) (6) (9) (7) (5)
Milano N.-W. Lombardia 20,096 9,816 16,264 24,319 29,702 710
(9) (15) (8) (6) (11) (4)
Bologna N.-E. Emilia-Romagna 7,792 7,712 – – 9,911 5,908
(4) (4) (-) (-) (4) (4)
Venezia N.-E. Veneto – 5,774 – 3,008 – 2,541
(-) (4) (-) (5) (-) (4)
Firenze Centre Toscana 7,257 14,719 11,534 11,438 14,880 11,662
(4) (5) (5) (7) (5) (6)
Roma Centre Lazio – – – 19,996 55,571 12,018
(-) (-) (-) (19) (18) (4)
Cagliari Islands Sardegna – – 6,799 6,063 6,502 5,231
(-) (-) (5) (4) (4) (4)
Catania Islands Sicilia 12,850 12,738 15,839 15,771 21,361 11,022
(8) (7) (6) (5) (6) (6)
Palermo Islands Sicilia 10,229 14,199 17,234 14,455 18,821 12,709
(8) (7) (8) (12) (12) (9)
Lecce South Puglia 8,966 – 9,715 – – 6,352
(4) (-) (5) (-) (-) (6)
Napoli South Campania 9,182 20,415 32,999 – 21,174 –
(8) (12) (7) (–) (22) (–)
Santa M.C.V. South Campania – 8,982 6,039 – – 10,711
(-) (5) (4) (-) (-) ( 4)
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Table 4: Courts to be closed by the Monti’s Government
Courts Area Region Merging Merging
into1,3 into2
Acqui Terme North-West Piemonte Alessandria Torino
Alba North-West Piemonte Asti Torino
Casale Monf.to North-West Piemonte Alessandria Torino
Chiavari North-West Liguria Genova (5) Genova (5)
Crema North-West Lombardia Cremona Brescia
Mondov`ı North-West Piemonte Cuneo Torino
Pinerolo North-West Piemonte Torino Torino
Saluzzo North-West Piemonte Cuneo Torino
Sanremo North-West Liguria Imperia Genova (5)
Tortona North-West Piemonte Alessandria Torino
Vigevano North-West Lombardia Pavia Milano (4)
Voghera North-West Lombardia Pavia Milano (4)
Bassano D.G. North-East Veneto Vicenza Venezia (4)
Tolmezzo North-East Friuli V.G. Udine (2) Trieste
Camerino Centre Marche Macerata Ancona (4)
Cassino Centre Lazio Frosinone –
Montepulciano Centre Toscana Siena Firenze (6)
Orvieto Centre Umbria Terni Perugia
Urbino Centre Marche Pesaro (2) Ancona (4)
Ariano Irpino South Campania Benevento Napoli
Avezzano South Molise Aquila Aquila
Castrovillari South Calabria Cosenza –
Lamezia terme South Calabria Catanzaro –
Lanciano South Abruzzo Chieti Aquila
Lucera South Puglia Foggia Bari
Melfi South Basilicata Potenza Potenza
Paola South Calabria Cosenza –
Rossano South Calabria Cosenza (2) Catanzaro
Sala Consilina South Calabria Lagonegro Salerno (3)
Sant’Angelo D.L. South Campania Avellino (3) Napoli
Sulmona South Abruzzo Aquila Aquila
Vasto South Abruzzo Chieti Aquila
Caltagirone Islands Sicilia Ragusa –
Mistretta Islands Sicilia Patti Messina (3)
Modica Islands Sicilia Ragusa Catania (6)
Nicosia Islands Sicilia Enna Caltanissetta (2)
Sciacca Islands Sicilia Agrigento –
Legend: 1 = According to the first proposal, July 2012,
2 = According to the second proposal, enacted in September 2012.
3: If size inefficient, in brackets the n. of subunits it should be split into (2008).27
Figure 1: Supply, Demand of Justice, and Economic activity
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Figure 2: One input - one output technology
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Figure 3: Industry Efficiency by Regions
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Figure 4: Technical Efficiency by Regions
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Figure 5: Technical Efficiency by courts
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Figure 6: Size Efficiency by courts
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Figure 7: Size efficiency: Courts that should be split, 2008
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